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Abstract   
This paper uses a multivariate analysis to examine how countries‘ tax morale and institutional 
quality affect the shadow economy. The literature strongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of 
these factors in understanding the level of and changes in the shadow economy. Newly available data 
sources offer the unique opportunity to further illuminate a topic that has received increased attention. 
After controlling for a variety of potential factors, we find strong support that a higher tax morale and 
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In the last two decades the number of studies investigating the underground economy 
has increased markedly. But knowing the unknown and therefore estimating the activities of 
the shadow economy is still a difficult task. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to get accurate 
information about shadow economy activities on the goods and labor market, because the 
individuals involved in these activities do not wish to be identified. Hence, trying to estimate 
the extent and value of the shadow economy activities can be considered as a scientific 
passion for knowing the unknown. Tanzi (2002) states, ―it seems that the economic 
profession, immersed as it was in its theories, could not cope or was unwilling to cope with 
the messy world of the underground economy‖ (p. xiii). In more recent years, economists 
have stopped ignoring the topic as the interest in this phenomenon has strongly increased. 
Generating statistics is important insofar as it allows making effective and efficient resource 
allocation decisions. A similar tendency is observable in other areas that investigate illegal 
activities (Schneider & Enste, 2002; and Schneider, 2005b). Studies on corruption in the 
1980s were largely confined to other fields such as political science and sociology. Economic 
studies on the subject have started to emerge since the early 1990s. The transformation of the 
socialist economies was one of the main reasons for this surge in interest since institutional 
weaknesses and corruption surfaced as major obstacles to market reforms (Abed & Gupta, 
2002). Moreover, the increased interest and new datasets contributed to a rapidly growing 
empirical literature on illegal activities such as shadow economy or corruption (see Schneider 
& Enste, 2000, 2002; Treisman, 2000; and Lambsdorff, 1999 for reviews).  
 Our paper investigates the relation between shadow economy, tax morale and 
institutional quality. Although there are more and more studies that investigate the causes of 
shadow economic activities, societies often attempt to control these activities through 
measures such as punishment, prosecution, economic growth or education (Schneider & 
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Enste, 2002). However, there are further instruments that merit more attention. It is highly 
relevant to investigate not only the importance of objective variables such as the tax burden, 
rate of public expenditure, or the density of regulation, but also the subjective perceptions, 
expectations, attitudes and motivations such as tax morale or the (perceived) institutional 
quality. Cross-country data sets such as the World Values Survey, the Latinobarómetro or the 
ISSP allows investigation of the impact of such factors on the macro level. This provides the 
fundament to test empirically the extent to which an integrated approach helps explain deviant 
behavior. Thaler (2000, p. 140) suggests that the Homo Oeconomicus will evolve into Homo 
Sapiens: ―As economists become more sophisticated, their ability to incorporate the findings 
of other disciplines such as psychology improves‖. Thus, data provide the basis to investigate 
the importance of more sophisticated theories at the micro and the macro level. In many 
experiments subjects have been shown to care about aspects as fairness, reciprocity, and 
distribution. According to Ochs and Roth (1989) and Roth (1995), many ultimatum 
experiments have shown that the modal offer is (50, 50), that the mean offer is somewhere 
around (40, 60), and that the smaller the offer, the higher the probability that the offer will be 
rejected. Moreover, according to Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993), public good 
experiments indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their 
endowment to a public good.  
We do not argue a case that the main economic factors are irrelevant, but rather stress 
the importance of extending the focus including, for example, a moral dimension. The 
violation of social norms is connected with higher costs of being active in the informal sector. 
Similarly, better institutions provide stronger incentives to behave legally and increase the 
costs of illegal activities as a consequence of greater institutional accountability. Behaving 
illegally is associated with higher moral costs. Hence, our basic working hypothesis is that the 
factors previously investigated matter, but that in order to explain international differences in 
the size of shadow economies we also need to take into account social norms and institutional 
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factors which we define together as societal institutions. In econometric terms, our hypothesis 
implies that the group of variables representing the role of societal institutions is statistically 
different from zero. That is, the size of shadow economy in any country does not depend only 
on external factors. If taxpayers perceive that their interests (preferences) are properly 
represented in political institutions and consider government to be helpful rather than 
wasteful, their willingness to opt for staying in the official sector and complying with their tax 
obligations will increase. In general, the better the societal institutions, other things equal, the 
lower we would expect the shadow economy to be. An important contribution of this paper is 
thus to extend the previous models by establishing the extent to which informal and formal 
institutions matter. In section 2 we present our theoretical approach and develop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data set and section 4 contains the empirical results. 
Finally, section 5 concludes with a summary and discussion of the main results. 
 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
 
Most economists have the tendency to base their analysis on neoclassic theory yet the 
complexity of the phenomenon may justify an integrative approach bringing together insights 
from different social sciences. An integrated human concept such as the RREEMM model 
may provide a solid foundation to investigate the phenomenon of behaving or not behaving 
illegally (Schneider & Enste, 2002). Such an approach not only considers the basic 
assumption of self-interest but also takes into account the relevance of social norms and 
standards (see, e.g., Alm, 1996). Researchers such as Frey (1997) stress the relevance of 
integrating a broader motivation structure and indicate that not only extrinsic, but also 
intrinsic motivation must be taken into account. Ignoring the importance of intrinsic 
motivation may lead to wrongly orientated policies and an underestimation of the crowding-
out effects a reduction of volunteering may have. However, Frey (1997) points out that the 
20.10.2010  page 5 out of 44 
 
attempt to combine economic, sociological, psychological, political, and biological man fails 
as long as the relative importance of each aspect is unknown and thus the interaction between 
them and the conditions under which one becomes dominant are open. Rothschild (2001) 
stresses that the complexity of the subject prevents the development of a ―general‖ theory of 
human behaviour but hints at the possibility that several theories may coexist to live up to the 
complexity of human behaviour.  
 
2.1 Tax morale 
 
The tax compliance literature has shown the relevance of going beyond a neoclassical 
approach when trying to understand why citizens pay taxes. Allingham and Sandmo‘s (1972) 
groundbreaking model which assumes that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated 
with the probability of detection and the degree of punishment has been widely criticized 
(e.g., Graetz & Wilde, 1985; Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1992; Frey & Feld, 2002). A main 
point connected to the empirical and experimental findings is that these deterrence models 
predict far too little compliance and far too much tax evasion (for an overview, see Alm, 
1999; Torgler, 2002). That is, in many countries, the level of deterrence is too low to explain 
the high degree of tax compliance. Moreover, a large gap exists between the effectively 
reported degree of risk aversion and the amount required to guarantee compliance. For the 
United States, the estimated Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is between 1 and 2, but only 
a value of 30 would explain the observed compliance rate (Graetz & Wilde, 1985; Alm, 
McClelland, & Schulze, 1992). The same is true for Switzerland: the relative risk aversion 
varies between 1 and 2, but a value of 30.75 would be necessary to reach the observed level of 
76.52 percent tax of compliance (Frey & Feld, 2002). Elffers (2000) points out that there is a 
long way before a person becomes a tax evader. Some researchers have argued that many 
individuals do not even think of tax evasion. Frey (1999) uses the expression ―ipsative 
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possibility set‖ (p. 196) and shows that there are taxpayers who do not even search for ways 
to cheat at taxes. Long and Swingen (1991, p. 130) argue that some taxpayers are ―simply 
predisposed not to evade.‖ Moreover, several experiments indicate that there are individuals 
who always comply (Alm, 1999).  
 To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, many researchers have argued that tax 
morale can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (for an overview see Torgler, 
2007). Tax morale, unlike tax evasion, measures not individual behavior but individual 
attitude. Tax morale—which is not a new notion but has received surprisingly little attention 
in the tax compliance literature—can be defined as a moral obligation to pay taxes, a belief in 
contributing to society by paying taxes.
1
 Tax morale is also closely linked to what have been 
termed as taxpayer ethics, ―the norms of behaviour governing citizens as taxpayers in their 
relationship with the government‖ (Song & Yarbrough, 1978, p. 443). Bird et al. (2006) argue 
that a sustainable tax system is based on a fair tax system and responsive government, 
achieved with a strong connection between tax payments and the supply of public goods.  
 Thus, we put forward our first core hypothesis: 
 
Core hypothesis 1:  A higher degree of nation’s tax morale reduces the size of the shadow 
economy in a country, ceteris paribus. 
 
It is a relevant issue to investigate whether differences in tax morale across countries are 
reflected in any differences in real, or observed, behaviors in these countries. Thus, we expect 
that tax morale has such real effects on the size of the shadow economy. Moreover, Alm, 
Martinez-Vazquez, and Schneider (2004) argue that the size of the underground economy can 
serve as a useful, if somewhat imperfect, measure of the extent of tax evasion, so that a 
                                                 
1
 Preliminary tax morale research in the 1960s (Schmölders, 1970; Strümpel, 1969) tried to bridge economics 
and social psychology by emphasizing that economic phenomena should be analyzed from a perspective larger 
than the traditional neoclassical point of view (e.g., Lewis, 1979, 1982). See also Kirchler (1987, 1998, 1999). 
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negative correlation between the size of the shadow economy and tax morale indicates the 
extent to which individuals‘ revealed actions are related to their attitudes about paying taxes.   
 A number of previous findings have investigated the simple correlation between tax 
morale and the size of shadow economy. Alm and Torgler (2006) focus on Europe and the 
United States. They find a strong negative correlation (Pearson r=-0.460) significant at the 
0.05 level. Analyzing the linear relationship in a simple regression indicates that the variable 
tax morale can explain more than 20 percent of the total variance of the size of shadow 
economy. Thus, the degree of tax morale has consequences for real behavior, and might be 
responsible for the size of the shadow economy: if tax morale is declining, then the shadow 
economy is likely to increase. The results are replicated in Figure A1 in the Appendix.  
 A similar approach has been used by Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2006) 
focusing on transition countries. The results indicate a strong negative correlation between 
both variables (-0.657), significant at the 0.01 level when working with the World Values 
Survey data 1999-2000. After including the WVS 1995-1997 and therefore increasing the 
number of observations, the correlation still remains strong and negative (Pearson r = -0.551), 
significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, here too countries with low tax morale show a clear 
tendency towards a large shadow economy. A simple linear regression suggests that a 
decrease of tax morale by 1 unit would lead to an increase of the shadow economy of roughly 
20 percentage points, and the variable tax morale can explain more than 30 percent of the total 
variance of the size of shadow economy (see Figures A2 and A3).  
 The informal sector plays an important role not only in transition countries, but also in 
developing countries. Employment in the informal sector seems to be a relevant income 
source for many people. Tanzi (2000) points out that it is realistic to assume that informal 
activities are more important in developing than in developed countries, because it is easier to 
conduct underground activities, since the exemption levels for income and value added taxes 
are lower, social security taxes higher, and the obstacles to start activities in the formal 
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economy also higher than in developed countries. Torgler (2005) investigates the correlation 
between the size of shadow economy and tax morale in Latin America using the 
Latinobarómetro. This annual public opinion survey is carried out in 17 Latin American 
countries (data from 1998). It reports the opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of the around 400 
million inhabitants of the region, covering most of Latin America with the exception of Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. We report the results in Figure A4. A strong 
negative correlation was found between both variables (-0.511), significant at the 0.05 level 
(sign. 2-tailed: 0.043). 
However, when investigating the developing and transition countries it should be kept 
in mind that in certain countries lawbreaking helps survive, for transaction costs of behaving 
honestly are too high. The key problem is that the government is not able to sufficiently 
secure the property rights in those countries. On the other hand a combination of 
interventionism and bureaucracy is often observed. Thus, a situation of simultaneous ―over-
government‖ and ―under-government‖ arises, as Frey and Eichenberger (1999, p. 89) point 
out. The government and the administration have a strong discretionary power over the 
allocation of resources which enhances corruption. Thus, individuals‘ tax evasion can be seen 
as an ―exit‖ option, a signal through which taxpayers can express their disagreement. De Soto 
(1989) and his research team conducted an experiment, setting up a small garment factory in 
Lima, with the intention to comply with the bureaucratic procedures and thus to act in 
accordance with the law. He reports that 10 times they were asked for a bribe to speed up the 
process and twice it was the only possibility to continue the experiment. It took 10 months in 
total to start the business (see also de Soto, 2000). 
In sum, the studies mentioned yield information about the raw and not the partial 
effects. The observed correlation might be explained in terms of factors that affect the size of 
shadow economy. It is important to investigate the causes as a whole with their 
interdependencies. An investigation that focuses on a simple correlation has a somewhat 
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limited validity. Thus, multiple regressions help us to disentangle the effects of other factors 
from a possible tax morale effect. 
 
2.2 Institutional quality 
 
It is not only the economic, but also the political system that affects formal and 
informal economic activities. Bird et al. (2006) stress that if poor countries want to become 
richer, they need to spend more on public infrastructure, education, and so on. Therefore, they 
need to tax more. But a key reason why they do not do so also seems obvious: ―it is not in the 
interest of those who dominate the political institutions of such countries to increase taxes. If 
this is the story, then economists, who do not readily take to the revolutionary barricades, 
have a problem in suggesting a viable solution‖ (p. 284). Thus the outcome in many countries 
can be explained as the underlying political conditions in these countries have not, for the 
most part, changed significantly over this period: ―Countries may tend to achieve an 
equilibrium position with respect to the size and nature of their fiscal systems that largely 
reflects the balance of political forces and institutions, and stay at this position until ‗shocked‘ 
to a new equilibrium‖ (p. 289). 
 It is interesting to question whether the recent political economy literature on the 
importance of institutions allows an understanding of the level of tax effort or the size of the 
shadow economy. And if yes, it is interesting to understand which institutions are relevant and 
which institutions can be modified to produce better fiscal outcomes and a lower level of 
shadow economies.   
We can expect that corruption and insecurity of property rights have an impact on the 
size of shadow economy. If the government and the administration have a great discretionary 
power over the allocation of resources as it is the case in many former centrally planned 
economies, corruption is enhanced. Agents such as the political elite, administration staff, and 
20.10.2010  page 10 out of 44 
 
legislators have a discretionary power if institutions are neither credible nor working well. 
Levin and Satarov (2000), e.g., analyze corruption and institutions in Russia. They raise the 
criticism that corruption is an integral part of Russia‘s economy. The negative consequence of 
corruption is that citizens reduce their trust in the authority. Levin and Satarov state that the 
degree of corruption exceeds the total expenditures on science, education, health care, culture, 
and art. In some industrial branches criminal groups spend up to 50% of their revenues to 
bribe officials (p. 115). In countries where corruption is systemic and the government budget 
lacks transparency it cannot be assumed that the obligation of paying taxes is an accepted 
social norm. Institutional instability, lack of both transparency and credible rule of law 
undermine the willingness of frustrated citizens to be active in the formal economy. 
Furthermore, there might be a crowding-out effect of morality among the tax administrators 
when there are a great number of corrupt colleagues. Citizens will feel cheated if they believe 
that corruption is widespread, their tax burden is not spent well, and that they are not 
protected by the rules of law. This increases the incentive to enter the informal sector. Corrupt 
bureaucracy will not assign the services to the most efficient producers, but to the producer 
who offers the larger bribes. Thus, corruption reduces the efficiency of allocation and 
produces delays in transactions to acquire additional payments (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 
1997; Jain, 2001). Such tendencies might have a strong impact on the size of the shadow 
economy.  
If citizens perceive that their interests (preferences) are properly represented in 
political institutions, their willingness to act in the underground economy decreases. On the 
other hand, in an inefficient state where corruption is rampant the citizens will have little trust 
in authority and thus a low incentive to cooperate. A more encompassing and legitimate state 
may be an essential precondition for a more adequate tax system. Thus our second core 
hypothesis reads: 
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Core hypothesis 2: A lower level of institutional quality increases the size of shadow 
economies, ceteris paribus.  
 
 
Friedman et al. (2000) show empirically that countries with more corruption have a 
higher share of unofficial economy. We investigate an additional factor of tax morale, which 
up till now has been disregarded by Friedman et al. (2000) and other studies. Moreover, we 
analyze the impact of institutional quality by using a large number of variables. Dreher and 
Schneider (2006) have also investigated the correlation between shadow economy and 
corruption. They observe the tendency that shadow economy and corruption are substitutes in 
high-income countries, but complements in low-income countries.  
In the following sections 3 and 4 we present the data and empirical results to verify 





3.1 Shadow economy 
 
The shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and 
services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons 
(Schneider, 2005a):  
(1) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 
(2) to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
(4) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
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Hence, in this paper, we will not deal with typical underground economic activities, which are 
all illegal actions with the characteristics of classical crimes like burglary, robbery, drug 
dealing, etc. We also do not include the informal household economy which consists of all 
household services and production. To measure the shadow economy as a percentage of the 
official GDP we will use the DYMIMIC-method to estimate the parameters for determining 
the size of the shadow economy and with the help of the Currency Demand Method to 
calibrate the estimated coefficients of the DYMIMIC procedure into absolute ones. We build 
average values for 1990, 1995, and 1999. The fundament of the database has been elaborated 
in previous studies and is therefore not further discussed in this paper (see Schneider, 2005a, 
2005b).  
 
3.2  Tax morale 
 
We define tax morale as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. It measures an 
individual‘s willingness to pay taxes, in other words, the moral obligation to pay taxes or the 
belief that paying taxes contributes to society. Data for the tax morale variable are extracted 
from several surveys: the Latinobarómetro (1998), the World Values Survey (WVS) 1990-
1993, 1995-1997 (see Inglehart et al., 2000) and the European Values Survey 1999-2000 (see 
European Values Study, 1999). Both surveys investigate socio-cultural and political change 
and collect comparative data on values and belief systems. Both are based on representative 
national samples of at least 1000 individuals. The World Values Survey (WVS) is worldwide 
and covers a huge number of countries, while the Latinobarómetro survey is carried out in 17 
Latin American countries. The general questions to assess the level of tax morale in the two 
surveys are: 
 
(i) World Values Survey/European Values Survey:  
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 ―Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: (…) Cheating on tax if you have the 
chance (% “never justified” – code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1=never and 10=always).” 
 
(ii) Latinobarómetro: 
 On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means not at all justifiable and 10 means totally 
justifiable, how justifiable do you believe it is to: Manage to avoid paying all your tax. 
 
In both cases the tax morale variable is developed by recoding the ten-point scale into a four-
point scale (0 to 3), with the value 3 standing for ―never justifiable‖. The value of 0 is an 
aggregation of the last 7 scale points, which were rarely chosen.
2
 Both surveys cover 
combined the period 1990 to 1999. However, the questions not are identical. The 
Latinobarómetro question focuses on ―manage‖ to ―avoid‖ taxes covering the entire aspect of 
tax avoidance while the World Values Survey assumes that you have the ―chance‖ to ―cheat‖ 
on taxes. Thus, the questions do not have an identical framing. We therefore check the 
robustness of the results working only with one data set.  
Of course, the measurement of tax morale is not free of bias. We use mean national tax 
morale values: consequently, we don‘t allow for subgroups. Thus, this is a nation‘s index 
rather than an individual tax morale value. In addition, because the available data are based on 
                                                 
2
 Of the two surveys, the World Values Survey provides more observations. On the other hand, the 
Latinobarómetro allows inclusion of more Latin American countries in the empirical analysis. Note that the tax 
morale questions are not identical. Eight Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) are available in both data sets. To judge from the average values for the two 
measures in the two data sets (WVS, 2.215 and Latinobarómetro, 2.113) the variables are almost identical. 
However, in order to maximize the number of observations, we work with the World Values Survey, which 
allows us to include other developing and transition countries. The average values for Latin American countries, 
which can only be constructed from the Latinobarómetro, are multiplied by the factor (2.215/2.113) to address 
some scaling effects. This approach allows us to include a larger number of Latin American countries in the 
analysis. 
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self-reports in which subjects tend to overstate their degree of compliance (Andreoni, Erard, 
& Feinstein, 1998), no objective or observable measure of tax morale is available. 
Nonetheless, because the way we define tax morale is less sensitive than asking whether a 
person has evaded taxes, we expect the degree of honesty to be higher. Moreover, the dataset 
is based on broad surveys; respondents are therefore less liable to react with suspicion and/or 
to be influenced by other questions touching the tax context. It can still be argued, however, 
that a taxpayer who has evaded in the past will tend to excuse this kind of behavior and report 
a higher tax morale in the survey. We use a single question that has the advantage of reducing 
problems of index construction complexity, especially in regards the measurement procedure 
or low correlation between items. Several previous studies have used such a single-item 
approach to define tax morale (Torgler 2007) and some previous studies have found 
consistent results using single-item survey measurements and laboratory experiments (e.g., 
Cummings et al., 2005; Alm & Torgler, 2006). However, we realize that there are some good 
reasons to use a multi-item index instead of a single question to measure tax morale. In our 
case, a single-item measure like ours has some disadvantages compared to a multi-item index 
(Lewis, 1982; Jackson & Milliron, 1986). Tax morale is likely to be a multi-dimensional 
concept, which may require a multi-item measurement tool, as in psychometric studies. 
Further, a multi-item index has the advantage that errors should tend to average out, therefore 
producing a more reliable measure. Compared to a single-item measure, a multi-item index 
likely provides better score reliability by pooling together information that the items have in 
common; a multi-item tool also increases validity by providing a more representative sample 
of information about the underlying concept, and it increases precision by decreasing score 
variability. Kirchler (1997, 1999) uses several items to measure tax morale. He confronted 
subjects with various scenarios, in which a fictitious individual overspends/underreports 
income on a tax return. After reading the scenarios, subjects could express their disagreement 
with or acceptance of tax evasion. 
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3.3 Institutional quality 
 
We use the Quality of Governance Index as a key proxy for institutional quality (see 
Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003). Our index values report the mean value of six 
governance dimensions for the periods 1996, 1998 and 2000 (first three rounds). It is based on 
several hundred variables measuring perceptions of governance and derived from 25 different 
data sources. Kaufmann et al. (2003) classify the six governance indicators into three groups 
as follows: 
 
1) Process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced  
- VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: measures the political process, civil 
liberties, and political rights, and 
- POLITICAL STABILITY AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE:  measures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized/overthrown). 
2) Capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
- GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS (inputs required for the government to 
be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods), 
and 
- REGULATORY QUALITY (focuses more on policies, such as incidence of 
market/unfriendly policies, perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation). 
3) Respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions  
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- RULE OF LAW (several indicators measuring the degree of agents‘ 
confidence in and compliance with the rules of society). According to 
Kaufmann et al. (2003, p. 4) these indicators ―measure the success of a 
society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules 
form the basis of economic and social interactions‖, and  
- CONTROL OF CORRUPTION: measures the perceived corruption (exercise 
of public power for private gain).  
 
All scores estimated by Kaufmann et al. (2003) lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores 
corresponding to better institutions (outcomes). We check the robustness of the statistical 
results for the governance index by also using all single sub-indexes independently.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Specification of the test equation and further hypotheses 
 
To test whether tax morale and institutional quality foster a lower level of shadow 
economy, we propose the following baseline equation:  
 
SHADOWi=  + 1 CTRLi + 2 TAXMi + 3 INSTITi+ REGIONi + i          (1) 
 
where i indexes the countries in the sample, SHADOWi denotes the country‘s level of shadow 
economy as a percentage of official GDP, TAXMi the level of tax morale and INSTITi are our 
indicators for institutional quality as described in the previous section. The regression also 
contains several control variables, CTRLi, including factors such as government interventions, 
fiscal burden, wage and prices controls, log GDP per capita, the agriculture share of GDP, the 
unemployment rate and the share of urban population. REGIONi are dummy variables that 
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differentiate between developed, Asian, and developing or transition countries. i denotes the 
error term
3





4.2 Empirical results of the cross-sectional analysis 
 
Table 1 presents the first results. The relative role played by our main variables vis-à-
vis other factors is investigated by estimating beta or standardized regression coefficients. 
Unlike the first three specification, the following ones use regional dummy variables
5
. In the 
first two regressions we explore the impact of tax morale and institutions separately. This 
allows us to see how our two key factors contribute to the overall fit of the regressions by 
comparing a specification with and without the variables
6
. We can see that the R-squared 
value increases after including these values. In addition, we also find that the effect is much 
stronger in regards to tax morale
7
. In the third regression both factors appear together in the 
regression. In specification (4) we also control for regional fixed effects and in specification 
(5) we add two further factors that may affect the shadow economy. In the remaining three 
regressions we start testing the impact of the institutional sub-factors.  
The empirical results in Table 1 suggest strongly that tax morale plays a significant role in 
determining the level of shadow economy. A higher tax morale leads to a smaller shadow 
economy. The beta coefficients also show that its quantitative impact is comparable to other 
determinants. Thus, tax morale clearly matters, being highly statistically significant in all 
eight estimations and also promoting a strong increase in R-squared. Table 1 also shows that 
                                                 
3
 For a summary statistics see Appendix Table A1.  
4
 The use of average values over a period allows maximizing the number of observations.   
5
 For an overview of the countries see Table A2 in the Appendix.  
6
 An extended approach would be to consider all possible subset of regressions which would allow identification 
of the unique variance explained by each predictor as well as the partial joint variance between sets of predictors 
(Budescu, 1993).  
7
 However, one should also take into account that the number of observations decrease after tax morale is 
included.  
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the institutional quality determinants are highly relevant for explaining the size of shadow 
economy. A higher level of institutional quality is correlated with a smaller shadow economy. 
Specifications (2) to (5) use the overall governance index as a proxy for institutional quality. 
This index shows the highest beta coefficient among all the determinants used. Similarly, the 
first three sub-indexes are all statistically significant with high beta coefficients. The strongest 
impact can be found for the variable GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS, followed by 
VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, and POLITICAL STABILITY. Thus, we can conclude 
that our two core hypotheses 1 and 2 cannot be rejected. Table 1 also indicates that 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
8
 have a positive impact on the size of shadow 
economy. More governmental interventions crowd out private initiative and investments in 
the private sector. The economic freedom to engage in business activities suffers, and 
frustration arising from too many interventions by the government might enhance the 
inclination to engage in illegal activities. 
As discussed, the fifth specification includes two additional variables, namely 
URBAN POPULATION and UNEMPLOYMENT. A higher density of population in urban 
areas may further anonymity and thus reduce loyalty towards the state; this may lead to a 
higher level of shadow economy. As many sectors are city-based, it is expected that the 
incentives to act in the underground economy there are higher, especially when government 
activities and services are below individuals‘ expectations and preferences. Moreover, a 
higher unemployment rate may be correlated with a higher level of shadow economy. 
Individuals without an occupation have more leisure time at their disposal. Thus, time does 
not act as a restriction to being active in the shadow economy. Moreover, these people have 
                                                 
8
 As a proxy for government interventions we use the Index of Economic Freedom provided by Heritage. 
According to Beach and Miles (2005, p. 65) this factor measures ―government‘s direct use of scarce resources 
for its own purposes and government‘s control over resources through ownership‖. Five factors are included in 
this variable (1) government consumption as a percentage of the economy, (2) government ownership of 
businesses and industries, (3) share of government revenues from state-owned enterprises, (4) government 
ownership of property of property and (5) economic output produced by the government. The scale goes from 1 
to 5 (the more interventions, the higher the score).  
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an incentive not to report their additional work hours as otherwise they would lose their 
financial support. If the wage of illicit work and the financial aid together yield more income 
than regular and overtime work, taking into account the costs of detection and punishment and 
assuming risk neutrality, full-time illicit work as an unemployed person yields ceteris paribus 
a higher utility. In such a situation, the danger that a person remains in the shadow economy 
and turns down job offers increases (Schneider & Enste, 2002). The variable URBAN 




 Table 1 also shows a negative coefficient of FISCAL BURDEN
10
 (but only in one 
specification statistically significant). The first result is in line with previous findings such as 
Friedman et al. (2000) and Dreher and Schneider (2006). It seems that a higher fiscal burden 
does not per se drive firms into the unofficial economy. As Friedman et al. (2000) stress, such 
proxies do not measure how the tax system is administrated, which might explain such a 
result.  
Regulations – particularly labor regulations – can also affect the shadow economy. 
Stronger restrictions are a strong incentive to choose the exit option, as they reduce the 
freedom of action (Schneider & Enste, 2002). As a proxy we use the variable WAGE AND 
PRICES developed by the Index of Economic Freedom provided by Heritage
11
.  The 
surprising result was statistically significant in all 6 specifications: price and wage regulations 
are no reasons for firms to move into the unofficial economy. Moreover, Table 1 shows that a 
                                                 
9
 We have also run regressions including URBAN POPULATION for all specifications, finding a coefficient that 
was not statistically coefficient.  
10
 We use the fiscal burden variable of the Index of Economic Freedom provided by Heritage as a proxy. The 
variable measures the marginal tax rates (top marginal income and corporate tax rate) and the year-to-year 
change in the level of government expenditures as a percent of GDP. The scale lists scores from 1 through 5: the 
higher the fiscal burden, the higher the score.  
11
 It measures the extent to which the government allows the market to set wages and prices, and evaluates the 
following factors: minimum wage laws, freedom to set prices privately without government influence, 
government price controls, extent of government price controls and price affecting subsidies to businesses. The 
higher the value in a scale from 1 to 5, the more strict the governmental regulations of wages and prices 
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higher GDP per capita is associated with a smaller shadow economy. Per capita GDP is a 
proxy for the level of development of a country. A higher level of development goes together 
with a greater capacity to pay and collect taxes, as well as a higher relative demand for 
income elastic public goods and services (Chelliah, 1971; Bahl, 1971). However, the 
coefficient is not always statistically significant as the specifications (1) and (2) indicate. 
There is also the tendency that a higher level of unemployment increases the size of the 
shadow economy, but there again the results are not fully robust. The sectoral composition of 
the domestic product may also affect the size of shadow economy. A traditional signal of the 
difficulty in taxing domestic output is the share of agriculture in GDP. The tax compliance 
literature shows the tendency that self-employed people such as farmers are more inclined to 
evade taxes than other professions (see, e.g., Torgler, 2007). However, our results indicate 
that the coefficient of the variable AGRICULTURE/GDP is not statistically significant.  
 Table 2 provides the results of the remaining three sub-indexes (specifications (9) to 
(12). In specification (10) we remove the variable GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS as it 
might be too similar to the variable REGULATORY QUALITY. As can be seen, the 
coefficient REGULATORY QUALITY in specification (10) is now statistically significant at 
the 10% level. The other coefficients, namely RULE OF LAW and CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION are statistically significant with the strongest quantitative effects among all 
the sub-indexes. To check the robustness of the results, in specification (13) and (14) we 
present variables from other sources that measure corruption, namely the Transparency 
International corruption index and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption 
index. The CPI attributes to each nation a single CPI score ranging from 1 to 10, which is 
annually published by Transparency International. A higher value means a lower level of 
corruption. It relies on the perception of corruption by business people and country analysts 
(for a recent discussion of the methodology, see, e.g., Lambsdorff, 2005). The ICRG provides 
an alternative set of data to the Quality of Governance Index, with special emphasis on 
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aspects affecting private foreign investment decisions. The data contain annual values for 
indicators of the quality of governance, 1982-1997, constructed by Stephen Knack and the 
IRIS Center, University of Maryland and provided by The PRS Group (see Knack, 1999). We 
are interested in the Political Risk Components of the ICGR. We derive an index (mean 
values) of the investigated years based on a component that measures corruption in the 
government.
12
 As Treisman (2000) points out, even corruption ratings that were constructed 
by different methodologies generally show a high correlation to each other. Table 2 shows 
that the coefficients are in both cases highly statistically significant with strong quantitative 
effects. Thus, the results support the finding that corruption is a key variable to understand 
what shapes the size of the shadow economy. Table 2 also confirms that the coefficient TAX 
MORALE is statistically significant with similar beta coefficients. This further supports the 
hypothesis that tax morale plays a significant role in determining of the level of the shadow 
economy. Table 2 also indicates that more GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS are 
associated with a higher level of the shadow economy. The coefficients of the other variables 
are consistent with the previous findings in Table 1.  
 In sum, the results in both Table 1 and 2 show that tax morale and institutional quality 




4.3 Robustness checks 
 
In a next step we provide a number of robustness tests. Previously, we have included 
additional variables in the baseline equation and we have presented estimations with all the 
                                                 
12
 Lower scores indicate that "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" and that "illegal 
payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with 
import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans.‖  
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sub-indexes of the governance index. Moreover, we use alternative sources that measure 
institutional quality, in particular corruption. In a further step, we investigate whether outliers 
are important. We run nine specifications that resist the pull of outliers, and make them more 
efficient using iteratively re-weighted least squares with Huber and bi-weight functions tuned 
for 95% Gaussian efficiency (Hamilton, 2004). The results are reported in Table 3. As a 
consequence more extreme outliers are less heavily weighted in the regression calculations. 
The findings provide strong support for our two main hypotheses. The coefficient TAX 
MORALE is always statistically significant, as are all nine variables that measure institutional 
quality. The variable GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS is always statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Interestingly, we also find a robust impact of the variable 
AGRICULTURE/GDP, a result that was not observed previously. The results for the other 
variables are similar. However, it is important to mention that the coefficients of the variables 
FISCAL BURDEN and WAGE AND PRICES are no longer consistently statistically 
significant. In fact, the coefficient for WAGE AND PRICES is only statistically significant in 
one specification.  
 We then consider only tax morale values from the World Values Survey and not from 
the Latinobarómetro, as the combination of two data sets can be criticized. The numbers of 
observations are only a little bit lower. The results are presented in Table 4. As can be seen, 
the previous results remain robust. Our key variables tax morale and institutional quality have 
a strong impact on the size of the shadow economy. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the 
variables FISCAL BURDEN and WAGE AND PRICES are now not statistically significant 
(except WAGE AND PRICES in specification 21). 
 In a next step we consider additional variables that measure the protection of persons 
and their rightfully acquired property. Thus, we investigate the following variables provided 
by The Fraser Institute in its Economic Freedom of the World Data (year 1995, see Gwarney 
et al., 2006): 1) LEGAL SYSTEM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS, 2) JUDICIARY 
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INDEPENDENCE, 3) IMPARTIAL COURTS, and 4) PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS. The scales go from 1 to 10, with higher scores for countries with 
better institutions. The results are presented in Table 5. As can be seen, all the coefficients are 
highly statistically significant with high beta coefficients which indicate that these proxies for 
institutional quality are also central elements in understanding the size of the shadow 
economy. Moreover, it is important to mention that the TAX MORALE coefficient remains 
highly statistically significant with comparable quantitative effects. Similarly, the positive 
correlation between government intervention and the size of the shadow economy remains 
robust.  
We also investigate whether the results obtained for the variable FISCAL BURDEN 
remain robust when other data sets are used. Thus, we include the top marginal tax rate of the 
Economic Freedom of the World Data (year 1995) provided by The Fraser Institute and the 
average marginal tax rate of the years 1990 to 1999 of the World Development Indicators 
instead of our fiscal burden variable. The coefficients were not statistically significant. We 
also considered further variables provided by The Fraser Institute, namely the impact of 
minimum wages, the hiring and firing practices, the share of labor force whose wages are set 
by centralized collective bargaining, and the unemployment benefits (whether it preserves the 
incentive to work). Surprisingly, none of these factors were statistically significant. However, 
the number of observations strongly decreased to 37, which indicates that these results should 





It is possible to criticize the direction of causality in our two main hypotheses. Does 
higher tax morale or better institutions cause a lower level of shadow economy, or do higher 
levels of underground activities undermine tax morale or the institutional quality? A 
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substantial increase of the shadow economy can lead to a significant decrease in tax revenues 
and therefore to a lower quantity and quality of public goods and services. The more 
taxpayers believe that others work in the shadow economy, the lower the moral costs to them 
to behave dishonestly and evade taxes by moving their own activities to the shadow economy. 
In this way the potential intrinsic motivation to comply and contribute to public sector 
activities gets crowded out. Evaluating the direct effect of tax morale or institutional quality 
on the size of the shadow economy requires an investigation of any potential causality 
problems and therefore an instrumental variable technique. The choice of adequate 
instruments for institutions is not extensively addressed in the literature (for corruption see, 
e.g., Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatόn, 1999; Bai & Wei, 2000; Kaufmann, Mehrez, & 
Gurgur, 2002). More recent studies stress the relevance of considering historical and 
geographic features of the countries as instrumental variables as they influence the outcome 
through their impact on the institutional and political environment
 13
. Studies such as those by 
Alesina et al. (2003) or La Porta et al. (1999) offer a broad data set to consider factors such as 
latitude, ethnic fractionalization, language, religion or legal origin. In our case we take the 
following instruments for tax morale and the institutional quality: legal origin (English, 
German, French dummies), latitude, fractionalization (language), religion (protestant, catholic 
dummies), and the legal system (political rights). Table 6 shows seven 2SLS estimations with 
several diagnostic tests. The results show that the coefficients of tax morale and the quality of 
institutions are statistically significant in all cases, which supports the previous findings. 
Overall, the used instruments are effective in explaining tax morale and the size of shadow 
economy. The F-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regressions are in all 
seven cases statistically significant at the 5% level for tax morale. The F-tests for the 
institutional quality are statistically significant in 4 out of 7 cases. It should be noted that we 
didn‘t change the structure of the instruments for the sub-indexes. In addition, Table 6 also 
                                                 
13
 See e.g., Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, (2001). 
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reports a test for instrument relevance using the Anderson canonical correlations LR for 
whether the equation is identified. The test shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected in 
almost all the cases indicating that the model is identified and the instruments are relevant 
(see Hall, Rudebusch, & Wilcox, 1996). We also present the Sargan‘s (1958) test for over-
identification for all 2SLS to examine the validity of the exclusion restrictions. This test fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid, which supports their validity.  
In sum, the empirical results provided in this section suggest that our two main 
hypotheses cannot be rejected. Tax morale and institutional quality play a significant role in 
the determination of the size of the shadow economy. The results fit into an interesting 
framework that Kirchler (2007) and Kirchler et al. (2008) suggest, namely the ―slippery slope 
model‖. The framework suggests that authorities‘ position towards taxpayers is relevant for 
compliance: In an antagonistic tax climate, when tax authorities communicate a ‗‗cops and 
robbers‘‘ – attitude, taxpayers will try to maximize their individual expected utility and only 
comply when forced to do so. In a synergistic climate, when authorities communicate a 
‗‗service and clients‘‘ – attitude, taxpayers will act on the basis of the perceived fairness of 
the system and comply voluntarily (Kirchler et al., 2007, p. 220). The model suggests the 
usefulness of thinking about procedural fairness, trust, reciprocity, and responsive regulation, 
taking into account a balanced concept between cooperative strategy and deterrence (trust and 
power). It emphasizes the entire compliance process that requires a close interaction between 
the tax administration and the taxpayers to be able to enhance trust, motivation and the 
commitment to contribution. Government and informal institutions are highly relevant in 
dealing with a hostile climate and can promote a climate of mutual trust. The strength and 
unique contribution of the slippery slope model is its coherent and overall dynamic 
framework of compliance, an aspect that is missing in the literature. Moreover, the model is 
testable, helps to understand previous results that were perceived as conflicting, and can guide 
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future empirical research that is interested in exploring the dynamic role of the tax authority, 






The paper shows that improving social institutions, (through such channels as 
enhancing tax morale, voice and accountability, the rule of law, government effectiveness and 
its regulatory quality, and by reducing corruption) helps lessen a possible incentive to ―go 
underground‖. Moreover, the legal structure and security of property rights are important 
factors that influence the size of the shadow economy. The most important contribution of this 
paper has been to extend the previous empirical model of the shadow economy by showing 
that tax morale and societal institutions in general matter quite significantly in determining the 
size of the shadow economy. Moreover, we provide strong robustness tests using a wide 
variety of factors that measure institutional quality. The results are summarized in Table A1 in 
the Appendix. 
As mentioned, the relevance of tax morale has not been investigated in previous 
studies such as Friedman et al. (2000). It is important to consider the moral dimension of 
complying with societies‘ rules. Social norms or social capital are key factors to 
understanding why people comply. Moreover, social capital seems to be an important 
determinant of economic phenomena like macroeconomic performance. For example, Knack 
and Keefer (1997), in a cross-sectional analysis, find a strong and significantly positive 
relationship between social capital variables (civic duty) and economic growth. Schaltegger 
and Torgler (2007), using data for a synthetic panel of Swiss cantons over the 1981–2001 
period, show that accountability enhances fiscal performance. As Slemrod (1998) argues that 
social capital – measured as the willingness to pay taxes voluntarily – lowers the cost of 
government operations and of equitably assigning such cost to citizens.  
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Such research justifies a closer look at social capital and societal institutions. A high 
level of institutional quality allows expression of one‘s own preferences, and involvement and 
participation in the political process enhances identification with a state‘s institutions; this 
counteracts the inclination to be active in the shadow economy. Participation and 
identification therefore reduce free-rider problems. If citizens and authorities interact with a 
sense of collective responsibility thanks to the institutional structures, the system may be 
better governed and the policies more effective, as accountability promotes effectiveness 
through its impact on government behavior (Schaltegger & Torgler, 2007). On the other hand, 
if citizens feel cheated, if they believe that corruption is widespread, that their tax burden is 
not spent well and that they are not well protected by the rules of law, the incentive for them 
to get involved in the informal sector grows. The institutional architecture seems to be a key 
component in understanding the shadow economy. A more encompassing and legitimate state 
with a well functioning law system is an essential precondition for a lower level of the 
shadow economy.  






Determinants of the size of shadow economy over 55-57 countries, period 1990-99. 
 
                
OLS         
Dependent Variable: Shadow 
Economy 
        
Independent Variables (1) (2)     (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
a) WILLINGNESS TO PAY TAXES         
TAX MORALE 0.179**  -0.172*** -0.157** -0.169*** -0.221*** -0.192*** -0.175*** 
 (-2.31)  (-2.91) (-2.63) (-2.81) (-3.01) (-2.77) (-2.82) 
b) INSTITUTIONS (KKM)         
INDEX GOVERNANCE   -0.693*** -0.500*** -0.613*** -0.443**    
  (-4.80) (-4.27) (-4.34) (-2.61)    
VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY      -0.307**   
      (-2.14)   
POLITICAL STABILITY       -0.217*  
       (-1.74)  
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS        -0.518*** 
        (-3.02) 
c) GOVERMENT         
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 0.203** 0.155 0.195** 0.256*** 0.287*** 0.252** 0.252** 0.256*** 
 (-2.32) (-1.50) (2.64) (2.82) (3.02) (2.18) (2.39) (2.77) 
FISCAL BURDEN -0.149 -0.210** -0.182* -0.216** -0.120 -0.132 -0.097 -0.132 
 (-1.46) (-2.11) (-1.99) (-2.49) (-1.53) (-1.20) (-0.97) (-1.48) 
WAGE AND PRICES -0.127 -0.175 -0.195* -0.225** -0.233** -0.240** -0.182* -0.224** 
 (-1.31) (-1.47) (-1.81) (-2.61) (-2.45) (-2.25) (-1.89) (-2.48) 
d) CONTROL VARIABLES         
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA) -0.751*** -0.0002 -0.300 -0.366 -0.701*** -0.677** -0.705** -0.637** 
 (-3.81) (-0.00) (-1.28) (-1.47) (-2.72) (-2.50) (-2.31) (-2.57) 
AGRICULTURE/GDP 0.055 0.058 0.087 0.030 -0.016 -0.038 -0.029 -0.102 
 (0.31) (0.37) (0.51) (0.17) (-0.09) (-0.24) (-0.17) (-0.59) 
URBAN POPULATION     0.175    
     (1.51)    
UNEMPLOYMENT     0.101* 0.134** 0.071 0.068 
     (1.77) (2.10) (0.83) (0.96) 
Regional Fixed Effects NO    NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 60 88 57 57 55 55 54 55 
R-squared 0.709 0.535 0.769 0.779 0.803 0.767 0.763 0.786 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions with robust 
standard errors. Beta coefficients reported.  
 
 




Further determinants of the size of shadow economy 
 
              
OLS       
Dependent Variable: Shadow Economy       
Independent Variables (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
       
a) WILLINGNESS TO PAY TAXES       
TAX MORALE -0.166** -0.170** -0.147** -0.145** -0.156** -0.131** 
 (-2.52) (-2.67) (-2.21) (-2.16) (-2.11) (-2.09) 
b) INSTITUTIONS (KKM)       
REGULATORY QUALITY -0.212 -0.240*     
 (-1.51) (-1.68)     
RULE OF LAW   -0.647***    
   (-5.27)    
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION    -0.596***   
    (-5.68)   
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL       
CORRUPTION     -0.429***  
     (-3.26)  
ICRG      -0.438*** 
CORRUPTION      (-3.23) 
       
c) GOVERMENT       
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 0.227**  0.244** 0.303*** 0.318*** 0.310*** 
 (2.09)  (2.50) (3.16) (2.92) (2.76) 
FISCAL BURDEN -0.109 -0.037 -0.130 -0.156* -0.158 -0.078 
 (-1.01) (-0.32) (-1.50) (-1.78) (-1.63) (-0.75) 
WAGE AND PRICES -0.220** -0.162 -0.256*** -0.232*** -0.187** -0.356*** 
 (-2.33) (-1.36) (-2.86) (-2.80) (-2.15) (-3.93) 
d) CONTROL VARIABLES       
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA) -0.883*** -0.913*** -0.480* -0.513** -0.568* -0.600* 
 (-3.17) (-3.16) (-1.84) (-2.09) (-1.86) (-1.98) 
AGRICULTURE/GDP -0.107 -0.111 -0.039 -0.033 0.048 0.089 
 (-0.63) (-0.65) (-0.25) (-0.20) (0.26) (0.46) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.088 0.053 0.047 0.052 0.014 0.176** 
 (1.25) (0.72) (0.71) (0.83) (0.26) (2.46) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 55 55 55 55 53 49 
R-squared 0.758 0.739 0.798 0.798 0.814 0.812 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 









Robustness check (Outliers) 
 
Dep. V.: Shadow Economy (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
a) WILLING. TO PAY T.          
TAX MORALE -6.407*** -7.301*** -9.685*** -7.650*** -5.793*** -4.733*** -5.207*** -5.868*** -6.137* 
 (-4.56) (-3.73) (-5.62) (-4.36) (-2.94) (-3.27) (-3.26) (-3.53) (-1.95) 
b) INSTIT.  (KKM)          
INDEX GOVERNANCE  -9.637***         
 (-7.08)         
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.  -7.186***        
  (-4.48)        
POLITICAL STABILITY   -6.337***       
   (-5.24)       
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV.   -7.699***      
    (-5.32)      
REGULATORY QUALITY    -6.699***     
     (-4.17)     
RULE OF LAW      -9.050***    
      (-7.29)    
CONTROL OF CORRUP.       -6.966***   
       (-5.86)   
TI          
CORRUPTION        -2.342***  
        (-4.55)  
ICRG          
CORRUPTION         -4.020*** 
         (-2.84) 
c) GOVERMENT          
GOV. INTERVENTIONS 4.455*** 4.934*** 4.157*** 3.660*** 3.476*** 4.403*** 5.294*** 5.953*** 5.856*** 
 (5.13) (4.11) (3.84) (3.37) (2.90) (4.98) (5.37) (5.37) (2.60) 
FISCAL BURDEN -3.296** -3.796** -1.248 -2.576 -2.849 -2.937** -3.481** -2.201 -2.222 
 (-2.65) (-2.19) (-0.83) (-1.68) (-1.68) (-2.37) (-2.50) (-1.46) (-0.90) 
WAGE AND PRICES -1.368 -1.505 -0.111 -0.370 -0.705 -1.202 -1.075 -1.844 -6.432*** 
 (-1.41) (-1.11) (-0.10) (-0.31) (-0.52) (-1.22) (-1.01) (-1.52) (-2.79) 
d) CONT. VARIABLES          
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA) 0.453 -2.131 1.117 -1.159 -4.744** 0.802 -0.918 -3.033 -7.302 
 (0.25) (-0.85) (0.51) (-0.53) (-2.18) (0.42) (-0.44) (-1.33) (-1.67) 
AGRICULTURE/GDP 0.494*** 0.408** 0.760*** 0.363** 0.350** 0.405*** 0.424*** 0.586*** 0.388 
 (4.18) (2.48) (5.16) (2.45) (2.13) (3.36) (3.19) (3.93) (1.23) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.251** 0.468*** 0.079 0.248* 0.314* 0.172 0.245* 0.106 0.434* 
 (2.14) (2.75) (0.53) (1.69) (1.94) (1.42) (1.85) (0.73) (1.74) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 55 54 55 55 55 55 55 53 49 
R-squared 0.822 0.794 0.807 0.802 0.792 0.822 0.805 0.785 0.782 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 




Sensitivity analysis (WVS tax morale values) 
 
Dep. V.: Shadow Economy (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
a) WILLING. TO PAY T.          
TAX MORALE -0.181** -0.233** -0.207** -0.187** -0.178** -0.152** -0.174** -0.185** -0.204*** 
 (-2.57) (-2.56) (-2.65) (-2.63) (-2.24) (-2.09) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.88) 
b) INSTIT. (KKM)          
INDEX GOVERNANCE  -0.576***         
 (-6.09)         
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.  -0.390***        
  (-2.92)        
POLITICAL STABILITY   -0.361***       
   (-3.41)       
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV.   -0.434***      
    (-3.56)      
REGULATORY QUALITY     -0.328***     
     (-3.37)     
RULE OF LAW      -0.594***    
      (-5.67)    
CONTROL OF CORRUP.       -0.444***   
       (-4.33)   
TI          
CORRUPTION        -0.305**  
        (-2.23)  
ICRG          
CORRUPTION         -0.401*** 
         (-2.76) 
c) GOVERMENT          
GOV. INTERVENTIONS 0.145** 0.201** 0.216*** 0.135* 0.143* 0.128* 0.182** 0.204** 0.289** 
 (2.00) (2.70) (3.21) (1.71) (1.78) (1.75) (2.46) (2.26) (2.60) 
FISCAL BURDEN -0.140 -0.146 -0.117 -0.112 -0.134 -0.116 -0.125 -0.128 -0.102 
 (-1.53) (-1.38) (-1.17) (-1.14) (-1.31) (-1.28) (-1.31) (-1.17) (-0.80) 
WAGE AND PRICES -0.103 -0.122 -0.061 -0.071 -0.107 -0.097 -0.082 -0.084 -0.300** 
 (-0.82) (-0.93) (-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.85) (-0.77) (-0.65) (-0.64) (-2.55) 
d) CONT. VARIABLES          
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA) -0.263 -0.461** -0.427* -0.421 -0.611** -0.195 -0.340 -0.458 -0.579 
 (-1.12) (-2.49) (-1.97) (-1.56) (-2.13) (-0.86) (-1.14) (-1.31) (-1.52) 
AGRICULTURE/GDP 0.087 0.066 0.079 0.044 -0.004 0.146 0.102 0.089 0.055 
 (0.45) (0.39) (0.42) (0.21) (-0.02) (0.77) (0.47) (0.39) (0.24) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.0001 0.084 -0.011 -0.011 0.033 -0.021 -0.008 0.008 0.132** 
 (0.00) (1.47) (-0.15) (-0.16) (0.51) (-0.35) (-0.14) (0.13) (2.37) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 50 50 49 50 50 50 50 48 43 
R-squared 0.822 0.794 0.807 0.802 0.792 0.822 0.805 0.785 0.782 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Regressions with robust 
standard errors. Beta coefficients reported.  




Sensitivity analysis (institutional quality) 
 
Dep. V.: Shadow Economy (33) (34) (35) (36) 
a) WILLINGNESS TO PAY TAXES     
TAX MORALE -0.149** -0.246*** -0.150** -0.224*** 
 (-2.46) (-3.07) (-2.43) (-4.03) 
b) INSTIT. (FRASER)     
LEGAL SYSTEM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS -0.364***    
 (-3.98)    
JUDICIARY INDEPENDENCE   -0.414***   
  (-3.00)   
IMPARTIAL COURTS    -0.329***  
   (-4.08)  
PROTECTION OF INTELLECT. PROPERTY RIGHTS    -0.467*** 
    (-3.21) 
c) GOVERMENT     
GOV. INTERVENTIONS 0.222** 0.237** 0.297** 0.074 
 (2.39) (2.15) (2.66) (0.71) 
FISCAL BURDEN -0.064 -0.066 -0.136 -0.075 
 (-0.63) (-0.64) (-1.23) (-0.72) 
WAGE PRICES -0.272*** -0.207 -0.294*** -0.211 
 (-3.45) (-1.65) (-3.84) (-1.55) 
d) CONT. VARIABLES     
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA) -0.824*** -0.642 -0.825*** -0.870 
 (-2.90) (-1.58) (-3.17) (-1.62) 
AGRICULTURE/GDP -0.095 0.052 -0.030 -0.139 
 (-0.62) (0.17) (-0.21) (-0.39) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.078 0.067 0.135** 0.095* 
 (1.07) (1.31) (2.30) (1.94) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 53 38 53 38 
R-squared 0.804 0.845 0.803 0.824 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Regressions with robust standard errors. Beta coefficients reported.   






2SLS Regressions        
Dep. V.: Shadow Economy (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) 
a) WILLING. TO PAY TAXES        
TAX MORALE -11.874** -12.018** -12.206** -11.682** -9.658* -8.851* -8.332* 
 (-2.44) (-2.36) (-2.28) (-2.34) (-1.83) (-1.89) (-1.88) 
b) INSTIT. (KKM)        
INDEX GOVERNANCE  -14.015***       
 (-2.94)       
VOICE AND ACCOUNT.  -5.826*      
  (-1.82)      
POLITICAL STABILITY   -9.107**     
   (-2.46)     
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV.    -13.092***    
    (-2.69) -11.366*   
REGULATORY QUALITY     (-1.74)   
      -15.103***  
RULE OF LAW      (-3.16)  
       -9.935*** 
CONTROL OF CORRUP.       (-3.05) 
        
c) GOVERMENT        
GOV. INTERVENTIONS 4.361** 4.149** 4.552** 4.283** 3.091 3.960** 5.312*** 
 (2.39) (2.29) (2.28) (2.29) (1.47) (2.18) (3.03) 
FISCAL BURDEN -5.359* -3.769 -3.457 -4.947* -4.975 -4.746* -5.005* 
 (-1.94) (-1.40) (-1.24) (-1.76) (-1.51) (-1.79) (-1.96) 
WAGE AND PRICES -6.613*** -5.278** -4.606** -5.929*** -6.776** -6.780*** -5.344*** 
 (-2.89) (-2.35) (-2.05) (-2.62) (-2.30) (-2.99) (-2.68) 
d) CONT. VARIABLES        
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA) -7.365 -12.024*** -8.900* -8.502* -15.495*** -3.952 -7.483* 
 (-1.64) (-3.00) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-4.08) (-0.78) (-1.77) 
AGRICULTURE/GDP -0.158 -0.104 -0.042 -0.290 -0.372 -0.087 -0.080 
 (-0.62) (-0.42) (-0.15) (-1.09) (-1.20) (-0.35) (-0.34) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.325 0.493 0.225* 0.259 0.398 0.137 0.185 
 (1.29) (0.80) (1.77) (1.00) (1.38) (0.54) (0.78) 
Regional Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Prob > F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Centered R2 0.757 0.761 0.724 0.745 0.703 0.760 0.787 
First Stage Regressions        
Tax Morale:        
F-Test of excluded instruments 2.99** 2.99** 2.99** 2.99** 2.99** 2.99** 2.99** 
Institutions:        
F-Test of excluded instruments 2.89** 9.20*** 3.06*** 1.83 0.17 1.79 3.09*** 
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 16.758** 21.353*** 17.012** 13.624* 8.749 15.943** 22.082*** 
Sargan statistic 2.729 8.230 3.703 3.585 6.308 1.563 3.706 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Instruments: legal origin (English, German, French dummies), latitude, fractionalization (language), religion 
(protestant, catholic dummies) , legal system (political rights). KKM: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi.  
 
 




























































Figure A1. Correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy 
 
Source. Alm and Torgler, (2006, p. 243). Notes: Au: Austria, Be: Belgium, De: Denmark, Fi: 
Finland, Fr: France, Ge: Germany, 
GB: Great Britain, Ir: Ireland, It: Italy, Ne: Netherlands, No: Norway, Po: Portugal, Sp: Spain, 
























































Figure A2. Correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy in transition countries (1999-2000) 
 
Source: Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, (2006). Notes: Be – Belarus; Bu – Bulgaria; Cr – 
Croatia; Cz – Czech Republic; Hu – Hungary; La – Latvia; Li – Lithuania; Po – Poland; Ro – 
Romania; Ru – Russia; Skv – Slovak Republic; Slo – Slovenia; Uk – Ukraine.  























































Figure A3. Correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy in transition countries (1994-1997 and 1999-
2000) 
 
Source: Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler, (2006). Notes: Countries are denoted as in Table 1 
together with: Az – Azerbaijan; Ar – Armenia; Es – Estonia; Ge – Georgia; Ma – Macedonia; and 
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Figure A4. Correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy in Latin America (1998) 
 
Source: Torgler (2005). Notes: Arg=Argentina, Bol=Bolivia, Bra=Brazil, Col=Columbia, 
Cos=Costa Rica, Chi=Chile, Ecu=Ecuador, El=El Salvador, Gua=Guatemala, 
Hon=Honduras, Mex=Mexico, Nic= Nicaragua, Pan=Panama, Par=Paraguay, Per=Peru, 
Uru=Uruguay, Ven=Venezuela. 





































Figure A5. Correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy 
 
Source: Torgler (2005, p. 137). Notes: Arg=Argentina, Bol=Bolivia, Bra=Brazil, 
Col=Columbia, Cos=Costa Rica, Chi=Chile, Ecu=Ecuador, El=El Salvador, 
Gua=Guatemala, Hon=Honduras, Mex=Mexico, Nic= Nicaragua, Pan=Panama, 
Par=Paraguay, Per=Peru, Uru=Uruguay, Ven=Venezuela. 
 








Dev. Min Max Source Results 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE       
SHADOW ECONOMY 29.413 12.944 7.670 62.500 Schneider (2005)  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
TAX MORALE 2.103 0.355 1.370 3.014 WVS/Latinobarometro - 
INDEX GOVERNANCE  0.125 0.833 -1.970 1.870 Kaufmann et al. (2003) - 
VOICE AND ACCOUNT. 0.092 0.941 -1.890 1.610 Kaufmann et al. (2003) - 
POLITICAL STABILITY 0.080 0.924 -2.390 1.650 Kaufmann et al. (2003) - 
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIV. 0.135 0.904 -1.830 2.370 Kaufmann et al. (2003) - 
REGULATORY QUALITY 0.172 0.801 -2.590 1.950 Kaufmann et al. (2003) - 
RULE OF LAW 0.153 0.938 -1.830 2.210 Kaufmann et al. (2003) - 
CONTROL OF CORRUP. 
(KAUFMANN ET AL.) 0.130 0.955 -1.610 2.390 Kaufmann et al. (2003) - 
CORRUPTION (TI) 4.603 2.320 1.600 10.000 Transparency International - 
CORRUPTION (ICRG) 3.565 1.204 0.338 6.000 ICRG - 
LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 5.914 1.720 2.200 9.300 The Fraser Institute - 
JUDICIARY INDEPENDENCE  6.689 2.056 2.300 9.800 The Fraser Institute - 
IMPARTIAL COURTS  5.739 1.733 1.800 9.500 The Fraser Institute - 
PROTECTION OF INTELLECT. 
PROPERTY RIGHTS  5.581 1.666 1.200 8.400 The Fraser Institute - 
GOV. INTERVENTIONS 3.202 0.814 1.700 5.000 Heritage + 
FISCAL BURDEN 3.693 0.613 1.750 4.960 Heritage (-) 
WAGE PRICES 2.716 0.761 1.000 4.750 Heritage (-) 
LOG (GDP PER CAPITA) 8.470 1.021 6.209 10.224 World Development Indicators (-) 
AGRICULTURE/GDP 17.123 13.843 0.210 59.970 World Development Indicators (+) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 9.308 6.170 0.720 39.300 World Development Indicators (+) 
URBAN 53.782 23.982 5.660 100.000 World Development Indicators (+) 
Notes: Reduction of the shadow economy, robust and statistically significant. + Increase of the shadow 
economy, robust and statistically significant. (+) and (-) not robust and therefore not or not in a consistent 
manner statistically significant.  






















Costa Rica Romania 
Croatia Russian Federation 
Czech Republic Slovak Republic 
Denmark Slovenia 
Dominican Republic South Africa 
Ecuador Spain 




Germany United Kingdom 
Greece United States 
Hungary Uruguay 
India Venezuela 
Ireland   
Note: Countries in the specifications (1) and (2). that provide the highest number 
of observations 
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